17 Bankruptcy-Related Working Papers Available for Downloading from SSRN

The following bankruptcy-related working papers can be downloaded from the Social Science Research Network:

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NYU's Alberto Bisin & Northwestern's Adriano A. Rampini: "Exclusive Contracts and the Institution of Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 886733)

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UCLA School of Law's Daniel J. Bussel: "Creditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation." (Abstract ID: 878485)

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Univ. of Texas Law School's Jane M. Cohen: "Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law." (Abstract ID: 874767)

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Univ. of Chicago Law School's Kenneth W. Dam: "Credit Markets, Creditors' Rights and Economic Development." (Abstract ID: 885198)

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Univ. of Georgia's Mark Dawkins & Linda Smith Bamber & SMU's Neil Bhattacharya: "Systematic Share Price Fluctuations after Bankruptcy Filings and the Investors who Drive Them." (Abstract ID: 881508)

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Nottingham Business School's Nicola Ficarella & Michael Gavirdis: "Enron & Parmalat two twins parables." (Abstract ID: 886921)

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UNC-Chapel Hill Law School's Melissa B. Jacoby: "Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?" (Abstract ID: 887523)

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3d Circuit Judicial Law Clerk Adam Levitin: "Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime." (Abstract ID: 889462)

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Wichita State Univ.'s Stanley D. Longhofer and Kansas St. Univ.'s Stephen R. Peters: "Protection for Whom?" (Abstract ID: 875362)

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UCLA School of Law's Lynn M. LoPucki: "Where Do You Get Off? A Reply to Courting Failure's Critics." (Abstract ID: 888325)

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Columbia Univ. Law School's Edward R. Morrison and Davis Polk's Joerg Riegel: "Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges." (Abstract ID: 878328)

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NYS Bar Assn.: "Formations, Reorganizations, and Liquidations Involving Insolvent Corporations." (Abstract ID: 885658)

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Northeastern Univ.'s Harlan D. Platt & Marjorie B. Platt: "Understanding Differences Between Financial Distress and Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 876470)

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Univ. of Texas at Austin's Ramesh K.S. Rao and Univ. of Md.'s Susan V. White: "The Creation of FirstCity Financial Corporation: A Clinical Study of the Bankruptcy Process." (Abstract ID: 880762)

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Penn. Law School's David A. Skeel, Jr. & Georg Krause-Vilmar: "Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors." (Abstract ID: 888182)

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SMU Law School's Joshua C. Tate: "Game Over." (Abstract ID: 888634)

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Univ. of Miami Law School's William H. Widen: "Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Bankruptcies from 2000-2004: Preliminary Results." (Abstract ID: 878388)

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Abstracts for each of these working papers follow:

Alberto Bisin & Adriano A. Rampini, "Exclusive Contracts and the Institution of Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 886733):

The paper studies the institution of bankruptcy when exclusive contracts cannot be enforced ex ante, e.g., a bank cannot monitor whether the borrower enters into contracts with other creditors. The institution of bankruptcy enables the bank to enforce its claim to any funds that the borrower has above a fixed bankruptcy protection level. Bankruptcy improves on non-exclusive contractual relationships but is not a perfect substitute for exclusivity ex ante. We characterize the effect of bankruptcy provisions on the equilibrium contracts which borrowers use to raise financing.

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Daniel J. Bussel, "Creditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation." (Abstract ID: 878485):

This article defends the longstanding practice of the bankruptcy courts authorizing Creditors' Committees to prosecute specified causes of action on behalf of Chapter 11 bankruptcy estates in particular circumstances against theoretical criticisms of that practice that have emerged in the wake of the decisions in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000) and Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. en banc 2003).

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Jane M. Cohen, "Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law." (Abstract ID: 874767):

This Foreword was written for the University of Texas School of Law Symposium, Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law.

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Kenneth W. Dam, "Credit Markets, Creditors' Rights and Economic Development." (Abstract ID: 885198):

Credit markets generate more finance than equity markets, particularly in developing countries. In credit markets the central institution, again especially in developing countries, is the bank. In many such countries, directed lending, crony capitalism, and related lending are key problems. And since banks are corporations, self-dealing involving loans to shareholders, managers, and politically important people is added to the common forms of corporate governance issues.


Initial efforts to analyze credit markets through the lens of legal origin had the shortcoming that the focus was on the law of bankruptcy rather than the law of secured credit. And even within the area of bankruptcy, the focus was on reorganization rather than liquidation, which is more common in both developed and developing countries. The law of secured credit is especially important in countries where mortgages on land are unavailable due to the absence of land titling. Secured credit law is often defective because of the absence of self-help remedies, especially in view of lengthy court delays. Legal origin may be important to the efficacy of creditors rights in developed countries, but there is evidence that it is an unimportant factor in developing countries. The assumption of commonalities within a legal family is doubtful in law pertaining to credit markets, as shown by the sharp differences between U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy law and the many differences in secured credit law found by the EBRD in the transition countries.

Where, as in many developing countries, judiciaries are weak, the law of secured credit is especially important because bankruptcy proceedings are likely to be slow and undependable. In such countries credit registries may, by building on the concept of reputation, provide a partial substitute for judicial proceedings.

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Mark Dawkins, Linda Smith Bamber, Neil Bhattacharya, "Systematic Share Price Fluctuations after Bankruptcy Filings and the Investors who Drive Them." (Abstract ID: 881508):

This study presents empirical evidence on the pattern of returns and investor trades around and shortly after Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filings. Consistent with prior research, we find that share prices plunge before and at the bankruptcy filing date. Beginning in the 1990's, however, firms often continued to trade on the major national exchanges after filing for bankruptcy. Thus, our primary contribution is new evidence on the patterns of returns and trades after bankruptcy filings.


We document a systematic pattern of returns after bankruptcy filings - the filing period price plunge is followed by a price runup in the immediate post-filing period which turns out to be short-lived. Thus, we find two post-filing reversals: (1) the price plunge in the -1 to +1 filing period is inversely associated with abnormal returns in the day +2 to +5 post-filing period, and (2) returns cumulated over days +2 to +5 are negatively associated with subsequent returns cumulated from days +6 to +10. These reversals are not attributable to bid-ask bounce, and they hold after controlling for various factors associated with post-filing returns (firm size, financial condition, use of debtor-in-possession financing, use of prepackaged filings). Detailed analysis of investor trades suggests these reversals are attributable to the activities of large traders, not to small, arguably less sophisticated traders.

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Nicola Ficarella & Michael Gavirdis: "Enron & Parmalat two twins parables." (Abstract ID: 886921):

The Idea to write this work is born from the wish to deepen the study of the phenomenon of business crisis, of the risk management and of the processes of restructuring proposed by the management of Enron and Parmalat.


These two financial bankruptcies have marked a new century, the bankruptcy of Enron and Parmalat have had a great impact on accounting firms and financial institutions, and have raised several questions on the independence of auditors and analysts.

This document is composed of five chapters:

The first chapter introduces the matter of business crisis offering a definition of the concept of crisis as a support to continue my dissertation. Besides, I try to underline the importance of the individualization and quantification of the objective and subjective causes of crisis of company giving a brief explanation on the system-company, analysing different American, English and Italian authors.

In the chapter II, I introduce the theory of the turnaround as solution of the crisis of the company, proposing the concept and its strategic, economic and organizational aspects. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the main international systems of management of the enterprise crisis, focusing the attention on the American system, of which I analyze the public procedure of chapter 11 and Italian corporate reorganization.

In the chapter III, I start to analyze the Enron Group, offering an inherent picture of the decade 1991-2000: describing the history of the society, its steps of expansion and its areas business. Then I summarise the phases of the collapse of Enron, trying to explain those that, in my opinion, were the causes of the crack of the society which can be considered. In this chapter it is stressed the analysis of the role of equity research analysts in the case of Enron and how the valuations of the company did not reflect the information of the company available: many alarming signals were publicly available and were overlooked by analysts who maintained positive recommendations on the company.

In the chapter IV, I start to analyze Parmalat, giving a general overview, quickly summarising the history of the company, its international acquisitions and mergers, proposing an economic analysis through the reading of the group's reports. In this chapter, I offer a brief analysis of the comedown of parmalat analyzing in the specific all the causes that have brought in my opinion to the default procedures for the group.

At the end of this work, there are the conclusions where I analyze two financial bankruptcies comparating two twins parables.

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Melissa B. Jacoby, "Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?" (Abstract ID: 887523):

Academic support for American-style corporate reorganization has been at an all-time high, or, at least, calls for the repeal of chapter 11 have been at an all-time low. Critics of chapter 11 now say, approvingly, that the process has become faster, cheaper, more creditor-controlled, and more integrated with market forces. World-renowned economists have looked to modern chapter 11 as the foundation of proposals to improve sovereign debt restructuring internationally. Endorsement of the modern chapter 11 is by no means universal, however. In Courting Failure: How The Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts, Professor Lynn LoPucki, a well known academic with deep expertise in bankruptcy, portrays the bankruptcy system in a state of crisis. In this book, we learn that nearly half of the largest firms emerging from chapter 11 as publicly held companies are filing another bankruptcy petition in just a few years. LoPucki attributes the high repeat filing rate to the judges who compete for cases by appeasing case placers, the parties who guide a firm's decision regarding venue selection. A high repeat filing rate first afflicted two magnet venues, the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, then spread nationwide as other judges have tried to attract cases to their own courts. Courting Failure's policy prescription is to eliminate inter-venue competition by restricting firms' venue choice. Since the release of Courting Failure, LoPucki has convinced a prominent Senator to introduce legislation accomplishing exactly that. Courting Failure is rich with systematic empirical data, anecdotes, law, theories, allegations, and controversies, as would be expected from a researcher who has made critical contributions to our understanding of corporate reorganization for over two decades. Plenty of academics, lawyers, and judges are examining myriad aspects of Courting Failure, including whether LoPucki oversteps by characterizing the bankruptcy system as corrupted, whether a significant repeat filing is per se undesirable, whether LoPucki uses the ideal parameters to measure repeat filings and failure in bankruptcy, and how all of this affects the international market for judicial services.


By contrast, I highlight other aspects of Courting Failure's ambitious thesis that ultimately cannot be sustained. First, Courting Failure cannot tell us enough about the pathways through which competition contributes to failed reorganizations for us to rely on the competition thesis to fuel policy change. Courting Failure's repeat filing data and his examples of competitive practices do not match up temporally or substantively, particularly with respect to the striking increase in repeat filings among firms emerging in 1997 and thereafter. Second, Courting Failure implicitly relies on an account of the drivers of court practices that does not square with the growing body of theoretical and empirical interdisciplinary research on the determinants of judicial politics and behavior. Others in the legal academy share LoPucki's assumption of judicial competition for large bankruptcy cases, although they have different views of its merits. Even if some judges do compete for large bankruptcy cases, however, the broader literature casts doubt that competition or the lack thereof is the dominant shaper of judicial practices in the way that Courting Failure suggests. In particular, Courting Failure takes insufficient account of the rise of the transactional model of chapter 11 and how the increasing recognition of this model might affect the evolution of judges' practices.

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Adam Levitin, "Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime." (Abstract ID: 889462):

Bankruptcy is a statutory system, yet it is replete with practices for which there is nodirect authorization in the Bankruptcy Code. This article argues that the authorization for judicial creation of bankruptcy law beyond the provisions of the Code has been misidentified asthe equity powers of bankruptcy courts. This misidentification has led courts to place inappropriate statutory and historical limitations on non-Code practices because of discomfortwith unguided equitable discretion.


Both the statutory and historic limitations are problematic. The statutory authorizationfor the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers appears to have been repealed by what one judge has called one of the clumsiest acts of Congress. The statutory section to which courts now look, 11U.S.C. § 105(a), is inapplicable, and its use as a framework for evaluating non-Code practices has led to questionable decisions. Likewise, the historic limitations of the pre-Code practicesdoctrine are unsatisfactory and have produced contradictory Supreme Court decisions.

Instead, this article argues that non-Code practices are better thought of as a federalcommon law of bankruptcy. Federal common law is judge-made law that depends on precedent and judicially-devised tests rather than unpredictable discretion or rigid application of statute.Viewing non-Code practices as federal common law would lead to more predictable and consistent decisions without sacrificing the judicial flexibility necessary to facilitate corporate eorganizations.

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Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters: "Protection for Whom?" (Abstract ID: 875362):

Once a debtor becomes financially distressed, conflict among creditors can occur, leading to an inefficient liquidation of the debtor. We argue that bankruptcy law is intended to protect creditors from one another. In the absence of a bankruptcy system, creditors generally find individual debt-collection remedies privately optimal, even though a coordinated liquidation would increase the total value of the firm's assets that could be distributed to the creditors as a group.

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Lynn M. LoPucki, "Where Do You Get Off? A Reply to Courting Failure's Critics." (Abstract ID: 888325):

By historical accident, the bankruptcy venue statute gives large public companies their choice of bankruptcy courts. Over three decades a competition for those cases has developed among some United States Bankruptcy Courts. The most successful courts - Delaware and New York - today attract more than two thirds of the billion-dollar-and-over cases. The courts compete principally because the cases represent a multi-billion dollar a year industry in professional fees alone, because local lawyers pressure judges to compete, and because judges who lose the competition are stigmatized and may not be reappointed.


In February 2005, the University of Michigan Press published my book, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts. In September 2005, Professor William C. Whitford convened a conference of leading bankruptcy scholars at the University of Wisconsin Law School to provide a critique. The papers from that conference, written by Douglas G. Baird, Mechele Dickerson, Melissa B. Jacoby, Judge Robert D. Martin, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel, Jr. and Charles J. Tabb, will be published along with this response in a symposium issue of the Buffalo Law Review.

This essay summarizes the critiques and responds. Part I reviews the four-step argument that corruption is the right word for what is happening to the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy judges are under pressure to attract big cases. Courts have changed substantive rules and rulings to attract them, affecting such matters as professional fee awards, trustee appointments, deference to consensus, critical vendor orders, onflicts of interest, executive retention bonuses, insider releases and many others. That every significant trend in big cases bankruptcy has been in favor of the professionals, executives, and DIP lenders who are capable of bringing the courts additional cases demonstrates that at least some of the judges are acting in bad faith. That is, at least some of the changes are driven by the desire to get cases, not a good faith belief that the changes are legal or desirable.

Courting Failure argues that court competition caused high reorganization failure rates in Delaware and New York during the period from 1991-96 and then high reorganization failure rates nationally when the competition spread to the rest of the country in 1997. Part II responds to a variety of objections to this argument.

Melissa Jacoby argues that high reorganization failure rates spread too quickly to be the result of competition. I respond that despite the problems with that thesis, it remains the best explanation of the evidence. Baird and Rasmussen argue that the failure of Delaware's prepackaged cases should not count because judges don't compete for prepackaged cases. I respond with evidence they do. David Skeel argues that Delawares high failure rate may be the result of a selection effect in which the weakest companies chose the Delaware court and were put on a "short leash" by saddling them with heavy debt. I respond by noting the complete lack of any evidence of a selection effect despite substantial efforts to find one.

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Edward R. Morrison and Davis Polk's Joerg Riegel, >"Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges." (Abstract ID: 878328):

The reforms of 2005 yield important but subtle changes in the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of financial contracts. They might appear only to eliminate longstanding uncertainty surrounding the protections available to financial contract counterparties, especially counterparties to repurchase transactions and other derivative contracts. But the ambit of the reforms is much broader. The expanded definitions - especially the definition of "swap agreement" - are now so broad that nearly every derivative contract is subject to the Code's protection. Instead of protecting particular counterparties to particular transactions, the Code now protects any counterparty to any derivative contract. Entire markets have been insulated from the costs of a bankruptcy filing by a financial contract counterparty. Equally important, the amendments limit judicial discretion to assess the economic substance of financial transactions, even those that resemble ordinary loans or that retire a debtor's outstanding debt or equity. The reforms of 2005 direct judges to apply a formalistic inquiry based on industry custom: a financial transaction is a "swap," "repurchase transaction," or other protected transaction if it is treated as such in the relevant financial market. The transaction's loan-like features or its effect on outstanding obligations of the debtor are irrelevant, unless they affect the transaction's characterization in financial markets. Absent fraud, form trumps substance - a desirable outcome, we argue, in light of the impossibility of drawing coherent lines between combinations of ordinary financial contracts and loans, dividends, or debt repurchases.

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NYS Bar Assn.: "Formations, Reorganizations, and Liquidations Involving Insolvent Corporations." (Abstract ID: 885658):

This report comments on proposed Treasury regulations issued under sections 332, 351, and 368, which provide rules regarding formations, reorganizations, and liquidations involving insolvent corporations. The authors commend the IRS and Treasury for focusing on the issues underlying the proposed regulations and for undertaking this project with a view to providing greater clarity in an area where the law is particularly unclear.


The authors generally support the conclusion in the proposed regulations that an upstream restructuring of an insolvent subsidiary cannot qualify as tax-free under section 332 or section 368. The report offers some observations and considerations regarding interactions with the consolidated return regulations that are created by the proposed regulations, as well as issues that arise when a subsidiary corporation transfers its assets to the parent corporation with respect to one class of stock while the other class receives nothing.

They also support the proposed modifications to the continuity of interest (COI) provisions and offer recommendations to improve specific aspects of the COI provisions, including: (1) priority claims that receive special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code should also receive special treatment for COI purposes; (2) the final regulations should contain an example demonstrating the disproportionate receipt of acquiring corporation stock and other property among the senior class of creditors; (3) the IRS and Treasury should clarify the circumstances in which the receipt of stock by a creditor or shareholder will be disregarded for COI purposes; (4) amounts received on partially secured creditor claims without a formal allocation between the bifurcated portions of the claim should be allocated based on the regulations under section 108(e); and (5) pretransaction payments should affect COI only if made in connection with the transaction.

The authors believe that the COI requirement, as modified by the proposed regulations, addresses the policy concerns expressed in the proposed regulations regarding reorganizations. In light of those policy considerations and the existing authorities, they recommend that the IRS and Treasury eliminate the net value requirement for reorganizations from the proposed regulations and clarify that no exchange requirement will be imposed on sideways reorganizations outside the bankruptcy context.

They also recommend that the net value requirement in the proposed regulations be modified to require only that the transferee must issue stock that has value in exchange for the property transferred in a putative section 351 transfer. Value for that purpose would be defined as the value that a third-party willing buyer would pay for the stock, instead of the corporation's net asset value (as in the proposed regulations).

Finally, the authors agree that if a net value requirement or modified COI provisions are adopted, liabilities should be broadly defined for purposes of determining net value and a definition of liability similar to the definition of obligation in Treas. reg. section 1.752-1(a)(4)(ii) should be adopted. They recommend generally that all liabilities should be valued using a fair market value approach because it offers the best economic determination of whether net value has been surrendered and received. In recognition that such an approach creates numerous and difficult valuations, they further recommend that the IRS and Treasury consider including some safe harbors for valuation purposes.

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Harlan D. Platt & Marjorie B. Platt: "Understanding Differences Between Financial Distress and Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 876470):

For the most part, research purporting to address the issue of financial distress has actually studied samples of bankrupt companies. Financial distress and bankruptcy are different. In contrast, this paper starts with a sample of companies that are financially distressed but not yet bankrupt. The sample was obtained by screening the Compustat industry database with a three-tiered identification system. The screen bifurcated companies into financially and non-financially distressed groups. A multi-tiered screen reduces the incidence of mistakenly identifying a non-distressed company as financially distressed. The paper then compares factors indicating the likelihood of future bankruptcies to those indicating future financial distress. To do this, an early warning financial-distress model was developed and compared to a methodologically similar existent model of bankruptcy. The final financial distress model included only one variable present in the bankruptcy model and four new variables. The limited overlap of explanatory factors between the models questions the similarity of financial distress and bankruptcy. Statistical tests lend support to the notion that the bankruptcy process is not just a continuation of a downward spiraling cycle of financial distress. Our hypothesis is that financial distress is something that happens to companies as a consequence of operating decisions or external forces while bankruptcy is something that companies choose to do to protect their assets from creditors.

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Ramesh K.S. Rao & Susan V. White: "The Creation of FirstCity Financial Corporation: A Clinical Study of the Bankruptcy Process." (Abstract ID: 880762):

This paper examines the bankruptcy of FirstCity Bancorporation of Texas and its subsequent emergence, through a merger, as FirstCityFinancial Corporation (FCFC). It illustrates several interrelated issues: a) how informational asymmetries and disagreements among the various claimants were efficiently resolved through the use of a Court's Expert, b) why a merger was critical for the success of the reorganization plan, c) the process by which the claims were valued, and d) the steps taken by the Court to ensure that the "best interests test" was satisfied under the reorganization plan.

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David A. Skeel, Jr. & Georg Krause-Vilmar, "Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors." (Abstract ID: 888182):

Using 1977 article by Robert Clark as the starting point, this Article attempts to shed new light on the question of whether and when shareholder loans to her company should be either equitably subordinated or, as courts have done in a few recent cases, recharacterized as equity. In its emphasis on the particular issue of shareholder loans, the Article has a narrower compass than Clark's article, which uses a four-part typology to explore the relationship among fraudulent conveyance law, equitable subordination, veil piercing and dividend restrictions. But the Article also expands Clark's analysis in several respects. The most important adjustment involves the general Nonhindrance ideal, which we use to identify a crucially important form of interference with the rights of creditors that Clark does not himself consider directly.


Part I of the article very briefly describes the 1939 Supreme Court case that served as a well-spring for equitable subordination doctrine in general, and for subordination of shareholder loans in particular. Part II then focuses on a series of recent decisions that have wrestled with the question whether shareholder loans should be recharacterized as equity contributions. Recharacterization doctrine is closely related to equitable subordination, but most courts view it as a separate development. Part II suggests that much of the confusion in the cases could be eliminated by disentangling two issues, whether the status of a loan is ambiguous (which raises issues of Truth, in terms of Clark's typology) and whether it was likely to destroy value that would otherwise go to creditors (the Nonhindrance concern); and by distinguishing bankruptcy recharacterization from the tax characterization cases that seem to have spawned the new doctrine. Part III then concludes by briefly considering the German and Austrian approaches to these same issues, which focus on capitalization and creditworthiness.

The most important, and initially counterintuitive, implication comes in Part II: whereas US courts have treated security interests as a badge of legitimacy in assessing shareholder loans, secured loans are actually the most worrisome form of shareholder investment. These security interests, we argue, should be disallowed.

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SMU Law School's Joshua C. Tate, "Game Over." (Abstract ID: 888634):

In the case of Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, the Ninth Circuit applied the hypothetical test regarding the assumability of patent licenses under Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. This Note argues that trustees should have recourse to the law of unjust enrichment when a debtor is unable to assume a patent license under the hypothetical test.

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William H. Widen, "Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Bankruptcies from 2000-2004: Preliminary Results." (Abstract ID: 878388):

This preliminary study highlights the importance of substantive consolidation doctrine to large public company bankruptcies. The study provides a definition of Substantive Consolidation Bankruptcy and then studies original sources for the top 21 bankruptcies during 2000-2004, measured by pre-filing asset size, to determine the extent to which the doctrine of substantive consolidation informs our largest restructurings. Secondary source materials also are analyzed for bankruptcies with prefiling assets in excess of $100 million for 2000-2004 and 1990-1999. The study aims to show the extent to which negotiation of reorganization plans takes place in the shadow of the doctrine of substantive consolidation.

© Steve Jakubowski 2006